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Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level
playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more
conducive to economic growth than extractive economic institutions that are
structured to extract resources from the many by the few and that fail to pro-
tect property rights or provide incentives for economic activity. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012, p. 429-430)
1 Introduction
The Industrial Revolution is arguably one of the most important events in the history of
economic development. As a result of industrialization, the average annual growth rate
of real GDP per capita in Britain accelerated from 0.4% in the 18th century to 1.0% in
the 19th century and reached 1.7% in the 20th century.1 An early study by DeLong and
Shleifer (1993) documents evidence that the rent-seeking behavior of ruling elites can impede
economic development and delay industrialization. Allen (2011, p. 15) also argues that
"economic success is the result of secure property rights, low taxes, and minimal government.
Arbitrary government is bad for growth because it leads to high taxes [...] and rent-seeking".
To provide a growth-theoretic analysis on this issue, we introduce a rent-seeking gov-
ernment to a recent variant of the Schumpeterian growth model that features endogenous
takeoff. We find that a self-interested government that is subject to weaker constitutional re-
strictions engages in more rent-seeking taxation,2 which delays the transition of the economy
from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. This result captures the idea
in the influential work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on extractive political institutions
stifling economic development. Furthermore, our growth-theoretic framework enables us to
perform a quantitative analysis, which shows that a completely self-interested government
could have delayed industrialization, relative to a benevolent government, by almost two
centuries in the UK.
The intuition of our results can be explained as follows. Rent-seeking taxation imposed
by the government creates a distortion that shrinks the level of output in the economy and
the market size, which in turn reduces incentives for the entry of firms. Therefore, rent-
seeking taxation delays the endogenous takeoff of the economy and stifles economic growth
in the short run. However, the reduced entry of new firms eventually increases the size of
incumbent firms, which gives rise to a positive effect on quality improvement and economic
growth. In the long run, the positive and negative effects cancel each other rendering a
neutral effect of the tax rate on the steady-state growth rate. These results show that rent-
seeking taxation could have a severe impact on the takeoff of an economy even when its
effect on long-run growth is neutral, highlighting the importance of considering the effects
on the long-run transition of the economy from stagnation to growth.
This study relates to the literature on growth and innovation. Seminal studies by Romer
1With an annual growth rate of 1.7%, income per capita would more than quintuple in a century, whereas
it would only increase by half with a growth rate of 0.4%.
2According to Drazen (2000, p. 459), "property rights can be considered in the narrow sense as applying
to taxation of property: even in the absence of the threat of outright expropriation, societies can nonetheless
legally expropriate the fruits of accumulation via taxation."
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(1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) develop the R&D-based growth model in which either the development of new goods
or the quality improvement of goods drives innovation in the economy. Subsequent studies
by Peretto (1994) and Smulders (1994) combine the development of new goods and the
quality improvement of goods to develop the Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous
market structure.3 An advantage of the Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous
market structure is that its implications are supported by empirical evidence.4 A number of
studies, such as Peretto (2003, 2007, 2011) and Ferraro et al. (2020), use the Schumpeterian
growth model with endogenous market structure to explore the effects of tax policies on
innovation-driven growth. This study builds on this literature by using a Schumpeterian
growth model with endogenous market structure to explore how rent-seeking taxation affects
the endogenous takeoff of an economy and its transition from stagnation to growth.5
This study also builds on the literature on endogenous takeoff, in which the seminal study
by Galor and Weil (2000) develops unified growth theory; see also Galor and Moav (2002),
Galor and Mountford (2008) and Galor et al. (2009).6 Unified growth theory explores how
an economy transits from a pre-industrial Malthusian trap to modern economic growth; see
Galor (2005, 2011) for a comprehensive review of this literature. This study also considers an
economy’s endogenous transition from stagnation to growth but in a Schumpeterian model
in which the endogenous activations of two dimensions of technological progress (i.e., the
development of new goods and the quality improvement of goods) determine the takeoff.7
Therefore, this study contributes to a recent branch of this literature on endogenous take-
off in the Schumpeterian growth model developed in Peretto (2015) by deriving the entire
transition dynamics of the economy and quantifying the effect of rent-seeking taxation on its
takeoff; see also Iacopetta and Peretto (2021) on corporate governance, Chu, Fan and Wang
(2020) on status-seeking culture, Chu, Kou and Wang (2020) on intellectual property rights,
and Chu, Peretto and Wang (2020) on agricultural technology.
2 The model
We introduce a rent-seeking government to the Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeoff
in Peretto (2015). The economy is initially in a pre-industrial era without innovation and
gradually transits to an industrial era with product development and quality improvement.
3See also Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999), Peretto (1998, 1999) and Young (1998).
4See Ang and Madsen (2011), Ha and Howitt (2007), Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Madsen (2008, 2010).
5Chaudhry and Garner (2007) develop a Schumpeterian model in which self-interested elites may block
innovation, whereas Spinesi (2009) develops a Schumpeterian model in which rent-seeking bureaucrats may
divert resources from innovative activities. Both studies focus on long-run growth.
6See also Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) for other early studies on
endogenous takeoff.
7Wang and Xie (2004) develop an interesting static model to explore the mechanism for the activation of
a modern industry; see Chang, Wang and Xie (2016) who incorporate this framework into a dynamic growth
model to explore endogenous takeoff. See also Desmet and Parente (2012) who develop a growth model in
which the expansion of the market causes the takeoff of industry.
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2.1 Household





e−(ρ−λ)t ln ctdt, (1)
where ct denotes per capita consumption of a final good (numeraire). The parameter ρ
denotes the discount rate, whereas λ is the growth rate of population Lt. We impose the
following parameter restriction: ρ > λ > 0. The asset-accumulation equation is
ȧt = (rt − λ)at + wt − ct, (2)
where rt is the interest rate. at is the value of assets owned by each household member, who
supplies one unit of labor to earn a wage income wt. Dynamic optimization yields
ċt
ct
= rt − ρ. (3)
2.2 Final good













where {θ, α, σ} ∈ (0, 1). Lt is production labor and determined by the population size.
Nt is the number of differentiated intermediate goods. Xt (i) is the quantity of non-durable
intermediate good i ∈ [0, Nt]. The productivity ofXt (i) depends on its own quality Zt (i) and
the average quality Zt ≡
∫ Nt
0
Zt (j) dj/Nt. This formulation captures technology spillovers.
The parameter σ determines the magnitude of a congestion effect 1 − σ of variety, which
removes the scale effect.
The profit function is given by
πt = (1− τ)Yt − wtLt −
∫ Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di,
where Pt (i) is the price of Xt (i) and τ ∈ [0, 1) is the tax rate (levied by ruling elites) on
the output Yt of the economy.
8 From profit maximization, we derive the conditional demand
functions:














where Xt (i) is decreasing in the tax rate τ . Competitive final-good firms pay wtLt =
(1− τ) (1− θ)Yt for labor and
∫ Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di = (1− τ)θYt for intermediate goods.










2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
A monopolistic firm uses Xt (i) units of final good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate
good i.9 The monopolistic firm also needs to incur φZαt (i)Z
1−α
t units of final good as a fixed
operating cost. For the improvement of the quality of its products, the firm devotes It (i)
units of final good to in-house R&D, specified as
Żt (i) = It (i) . (7)
The firm’s profit flow before R&D is10

















[Πs (i)− Is (i)] ds. (9)
The firmmaximizes (9) subject to (7) and (8). Solving this dynamic optimization problem
yields the profit-maximizing price as Pt(i) = 1/θ. Here, we follow Chu, Kou andWang (2020)
to assume that competitive firms can also manufacture Xt(i) with the same quality Zt(i)
as the monopolistic firm, but they need to incur a higher unit cost of production given by
µ > 1. To price these competitive firms out of the market, the monopolistic firm sets its
price as
Pt(i) = min {µ, 1/θ} = µ, (10)
where we assume µ < 1/θ.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have Zt (i) = Zt for i ∈ [0, Nt], which together with (6)
implies an equal firm size Xt (i) = Xt across industries.
11 From (6) and (10), the quality-











which is decreasing in the tax rate τ that acts as a wedge and reduces firm size. We define












which is a state variable that depends on Lt/N
1−σ
t . Lemma 1 presents the rate of return on
quality-improving R&D, which is decreasing in the tax rate and increasing in firm size xt.
9This common assumption simplifies the transition dynamics. If intermediate goods were produced using
capital instead, then rent-seeking taxation would also create a distortion that reduces capital accumulation
and shrinks the size of firms. However, the transition dynamics would become more complicated.
10For simplicity, we do not consider other tax instruments in this sector. See Peretto (2007) for an analysis
of different tax instruments in the Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure and also
Iacopetta and Peretto (2020) in which corporate governance distortion is like a tax on monopolistic profit.
11Symmetry also implies Πt (i) = Πt, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
2.4 Entrants
Developing a new variety of intermediate goods and setting up its operation require δXt
units of final good, where δ > 0 is an entry-cost parameter. Let Vt denote the value of a new








When entry is positive, the entry condition is given by
Vt = δXt. (15)

























which also uses V̇t/Vt = Ẋt/Xt = zt + ẋt/xt, where zt ≡ Żt/Zt is the quality growth rate.
Equation (16) shows that ret is also decreasing in the tax rate and increasing in firm size xt.
2.5 Aggregation












= σnt + zt, (18)
which is determined by the quality growth rate zt and the variety growth rate nt ≡ Ṅt/Nt.
12To ensure symmetry, we assume that all new firms at time t have access to the aggregate technology Zt.
13One can also subtract intermediate inputs from output to compute the growth rate of GDP per capita.
Derivations are available upon request.
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2.6 Equilibrium
See Appendix B for the definition of the equilibrium.
2.7 Dynamics of firm size











> µ− 1. (19)
In Section 3, we will show that given an initial value x0, firm size xt gradually increases
towards a steady-state value x∗. The economy is initially in a pre-industrial era in which the
variety growth rate nt and the quality growth rate zt are both zero because firm size xt is too
small to provide sufficient incentives for innovation.14 As firm size xt becomes sufficiently
large, the economy enters the first phase of the industrial era in which firms begin to invent
new intermediate goods and nt becomes positive. Then, as firm size xt becomes even larger,
15
the economy enters the second phase of the industrial era in which firms begin to also improve
the quality of intermediate goods and zt becomes positive as well. Eventually, the economy
reaches the balanced growth path along which per capita output grows at a steady-state
growth rate.
2.8 Dynamics of the consumption-output ratio
We follow Chu, Peretto and Wang (2020) to assume that monopolistic firms do not yet
operate in the pre-industrial era and only emerge when innovation occurs. In this case,
competitive firms produce intermediate goods. As a result, the intermediate-good sector
generates zero profit in the pre-industrial era in which per capita consumption is simply
ct = wt = (1− τ)(1− θ)yt, (20)
which implies a stationary consumption-output ratio ct/yt = (1− τ)(1− θ).
16
As soon as the economy enters the first phase of the industrial era, innovation is activated,
and the entry condition Vt = δXt in (15) holds.










Proof. See Appendix A.
14Specifically, xt < xN in (27).
15Specifically, xt > xZ in (35).
16This helps to ensure that the tax rate to be chosen by the government is constant; see (24).
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3 Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff
Given that the tax rate τ acts as a wedge and reduces the rates of return to innovation,
we now explore its determinants. Self-interested elites control the government and consume
the tax revenue Tt = τYt.
17 For simplicity, they are myopic and have a static objective
function:18
Wt = ϕ lnTt + (1− ϕ) ln ct, (22)
where the parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight that the government places on its self-interest
at the expense of the household. A larger ϕ implies a more self-interested government.
Therefore, ϕ is decreasing in the degree to which a government needs to be responsible to
its citizens and is subject to constitutional restrictions.
Substituting (17) and (20) or (21) into (22) yields




where we have dropped the exogenous terms and the pre-determined variables. Differentiat-
ing (23) with respect to τ yields
τ = ϕ(1− θ), (24)
which shows that the tax rate τ chosen by the elites has a nice property of being stationary
across all eras. Although τ is constant, it is endogenous and determined by two structural
parameters: the degree ϕ of the elites’ self-interest and the intensity θ of intermediate goods
in production. Equation (24) shows that τ is increasing in the degree ϕ of its self-interest.
If the government is completely benevolent (i.e., ϕ = 0), then the tax rate τ would be zero.
If the government is completely self-interested (i.e., ϕ = 1), then the tax rate τ would be
1− θ, which is decreasing in θ because a larger θ amplifies the distortionary effect of the tax
wedge on intermediate goods Xt as shown in (6).
3.1 The pre-industrial era
In the pre-industrial era, the firm size xt is not large enough to activate innovation. Therefore,
the growth rate of output per capita is
gt = σnt + zt = 0 (25)
because nt = zt = 0. In the pre-industrial era, the economy does not experience economic
growth because xt is too small to provide incentives for innovation; see (27) and (28). How-
ever, given x0, xt = θ
1/(1−θ)Lt/N
1−σ




and hence, xt eventually becomes sufficiently large to activate innovation.
17All our analytical and numerical results are robust to the presence of a public good; see Appendix C.
18See Chu (2010) for a fully dynamic analysis of rent-seeking elites in an AK growth model.
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3.2 The first phase of the industrial era







µ− 1− δ(ρ− λ)
> x0. (27)
A higher tax rate τ increases xN and delays industrialization at time tN = ln(xN/x0)/λ.
Intuitively, the rent-seeking distortion reduces incentives for the entry of firms. The variety













− ρ+ λ > 0, (28)



















which implies xt continues to grow despite nt > 0. The growth rate of output per capita is












− σ(ρ− λ) > 0, (30)
which is decreasing in the tax rate τ for a given xt. Intuitively, rent-seeking distortion
reduces the entry of firms. In the first phase of the industrial era, the growth rate gt in (30)
is determined by variety-expanding innovation and gradually rises as xt increases.
3.3 The second phase of the industrial era
When xt rises above a second threshold xZ > xN ,
20 quality-improving innovation is also
activated. In this case, the growth rate of output per capita is determined by the rate of










− ρ > 0, (31)
which is decreasing in the tax rate τ because it reduces the return on quality-improving
R&D. As firm size xt continues to expand, the growth rate gt in (31) gradually rises as
before.
In the second phase of the industrial era, economic growth is determined by both quality-
improving innovation and variety-expanding innovation; i.e., gt = zt + σnt. Therefore, (31)
implies that the quality growth rate zt is given by









− ρ− σnt > 0, (32)
19Here, we use zt = 0, r
e
t
= rt = ρ+ gt = ρ+ σnt and ẋt/xt = λ− (1− σ)nt.
20This inequality holds if α is below a threshold. Derivations are available upon request.
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− ρ+ λ > 0. (33)
Equations (32)-(33) determine the variety growth rate nt as a function of xt, which evolves


























which is stable given (19). Equations (32)-(33) also determine the quality growth rate zt as























3.4 Balanced growth path







(1− α)φ− [ρ+ σλ/(1− σ)]
(1− α)(µ− 1)− δ [ρ+ σλ/(1− σ)]
> xZ , (36)
which is increasing in the tax rate τ due to the reduced entry of firms. Substituting (36)




(1− α)φ− [ρ+ σλ/(1− σ)]
(1− α)(µ− 1)− δ [ρ+ σλ/(1− σ)]
− φ
]
− ρ > 0, (37)
which is independent of the tax rate τ because its direct negative effect and the indirect
positive effect via x∗ cancel each other. This result reflects the scale-invariant property from
endogenous market structure in the Schumpeterian growth model. In other words, the tax
wedge affecting the economy via firm size does not stifle economic growth in the long run;
however, its effects on the economy can still be severe as we will show next.
3.5 From stagnation to growth
In the pre-industrial era, output per capita remains constant. In the first phase of the
industrial era (i.e., t ≥ tN), variety-expanding innovation is activated, and output per capita
starts to grow. In the second phase (i.e., t ≥ tZ), quality-improving innovation is also
21Here, we use re
t
= rt = ρ+ gt = ρ+ σnt + zt and ẋt/xt = λ− (1− σ)nt.
22Given ẋt/xt = λ− (1− σ)nt = 0, the steady-state variety growth rate is simply n
∗ = λ/(1− σ).
10
activated. Gradually, the growth rate of output per capita rises towards the steady-state
growth rate g∗; see Figure 1.
Figure 1: Endogenous takeoff
Figure 1 shows that a higher tax rate τ delays the takeoff because xN in (27) is increasing
in τ . For a given firm size xt, a higher tax rate τ also decreases the transitional growth rate
gt; see (30) and (31). Intuitively, rent-seeking distortion reduces the incentives for entry and
quality-improving R&D. However, the steady-state firm size x∗ in (36) is increasing in τ due
to the reduced entry of firms. Overall, the effect of τ on the steady-state growth rate g∗ in
(37) is neutral due to the scale-invariant property of the model. Therefore, although rent-
seeking taxation does not affect long-run growth, it delays the takeoff of the economy and
slows down its growth on the transition path, which highlights the importance of considering
the effects of taxation on the entire path of economic growth.
Proposition 1 A stronger preference ϕ of the government for rent seeking leads to a higher
tax rate, a later takeoff of the economy and a lower transitional growth rate (for a given firm
size) in the industrial era but does not affect the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, we quantify the effect of rent-seeking taxation on the delay in the takeoff of the
economy. The tractability of the Peretto model enables us to derive a closed-form solution for
this effect. A completely self-interested government (i.e., τ s = 1−θ) delays industrialization,



























The equilibrium expression for ∆tN in (38) has the advantage of depending on only two
parameters.23 We calibrate the values of θ and λ in (38) by considering a conventional labor
share 1 − θ of 0.60 and a historical population growth rate λ of 0.8% in the 18th to early
23This result is robust to the inclusion of a public good; see Appendix C.
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19th century in the UK.24 Given these parameter values, ∆tN is 191 years. Figure 2 presents
∆tN for λ ∈ [0.5%, 1.5%] and θ ∈ [0.3, 0.5]. For example, if λ = 0.8% and θ ∈ [0.3, 0.5], then
∆tN varies slightly from 173 years to 215 years. However, if θ = 0.4 and λ ∈ [0.5%, 1.5%],
then ∆tN ranges from 102 years to 305 years. Therefore, the variation in ∆tN comes mostly
from changes in λ as it determines how fast firm size xt reaches the first threshold xN .
Figure 2: Years of delay in industrialization
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed rent-seeking elites in a Schumpeterian growth model with
endogenous takeoff. Specifically, the elites impose a tax on the economy to extract resources
for their self-interest, capturing the idea of extractive political institutions in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012). A higher degree of the elites’ self-interest causes more rent-seeking taxation,
which impedes economic development and delays industrialization. Quantitatively, the delay
is in the order of centuries. For simplicity, we have considered myopic elites. Forward-looking
elites would still engage in rent-seeking taxation, but to a lesser extent in order to benefit
from economic growth. Therefore, our quantitative results should be viewed as an upper
bound on the magnitude of the delay in industrialization.
24Data source: Maddison Project Database.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the Hamiltonian to solve the firm’s dynamic optimization.
The current-value Hamiltonian of firm i is given by
Ht (i) = Πt (i)− It (i) + ζt (i) Żt (i) + ξt (i) [µ− Pt (i)] , (A1)
where ζt (i) is the costate variable on Żt (i) and ξt (i) is the multiplier on Pt (i) ≤ µ. We






= ξt (i) , (A2)
∂Ht (i)
∂It (i)
















= rtζt (i)− ζ̇t (i) , (A4)
where Zt (i) is a state variable. If Pt (i) < µ, then ξt (i) = 0. In this case, ∂Πt (i) /∂Pt (i) = 0
yields Pt (i) = 1/θ. If the constraint on Pt (i) is binding, then ξt (i) > 0. In this case, we have
Pt (i) = µ. This proves (10). Then, the assumption µ < 1/θ implies Pt (i) = µ. Substituting
(A3), (12) and Pt (i) = µ into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield (13).











which also uses (1− τ)θYt = µXtNt. Differentiating (A5) with respect to t yields
δ(1− τ)θ
µ
ẏt = ȧt = (rt − λ)at + (1− τ)(1− θ)yt − ct, (A6)


















which implies that the consumption-output ratio jumps to the steady-state value in (21)
whenever the entry condition in (15) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1. Use (24) to show that τ is increasing in ϕ. Use (27) to show
that xN is increasing in τ . Use (30) and (31) to show that gt is decreasing in τ for a given
xt. Use (37) to show that g
∗ is independent of τ .
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Appendix B: Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations {at, ct, Yt, Xt, It} and prices {rt, wt, Pt, Vt}
such that
• the household maximizes utility taking rt as given;
• competitive final-good firms produce Yt and maximize profits taking {wt, Pt} as given;
• intermediate-good firms choose {Pt, It} to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
• entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
• the value of monopolistic firms adds up to the value of the household’s assets such that
NtVt = atLt;
• the government balances its fiscal budget Tt = τYt; and
• the market-clearing condition of the final good holds:
Yt = ctLt + µNtXt + Tt, (B1)
Yt = ctLt +Nt (Xt + φZt + It) + ṄtδXt + Tt, (B2)
where (B1) applies to the pre-industrial era and (B2) applies to the industrial era.
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Appendix C: Public Good
In this appendix, we show the robustness of our analytical and numerical results in the
presence of a public good Gt = γYt, where γ ∈ [0, 1) is a parameter. In this case, the tax
revenue consumed by the self-interested elites is
Tt = (τ − γ)Yt. (C1)
Substituting (C1) along with (17) and (20) or (21) into (22) yields




Then, differentiating (C2) with respect to τ yields
τ = γ + (1− γ)ϕ(1− θ), (C3)
which is increasing in ϕ as before. A completely self-interested government chooses τ s =











which shows the same expression as (38) for the delay in the industrialization of the economy.
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